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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
shown to have been of more or less than one-half? The
act is silent on the subject. The only facts that would
seem to be relevant to rebut the presumption would be the
facts as to the actual, original ownership of the property."'
If the survivor shows that the property was originally his
and that the joint ownership form resulted from his gift,
the conclusion would be that no tax is due as there is no
transfer. But is there not actually as much a transfer by
death in such a case as where the property was paid for
equally by both? Is the presumption rebuttable by the
Commonwealth? May it show that the survivor originally
owned none of the property and that, therefore, the transfer is of all of the property? There is no reason to distinguish the two situations. It is inevitable that the question will give rise to much dispute in the collection of taxes.
It is to be regretted that the act did not make the presumption irrebuttable.
Harold S. Irwin

DISTRIBUTION OF EXTRAORDINARY DIVIDENDS
IN CORPORATE STOCK TRUSTS
Where a trust consists of corporate stocks an interesting question is presented as to whether the life tenant or
the remainderman or both are to benefit by the extraordinary dividends. The majority rule' commonly called
The expression used in the federal act is a nicer one. The
act imposes the tax on the whole of the property held by. the deceased
joint tenant or tenant by the entirety but creates an exception, with
the burden on the taxpayer to show such exception, "such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person
and never to have been received or acquired by the latter from the
decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth . . ." See 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1094 (e).
18

'Discussion of Pennsylvania rule up to 1928, see 33 Dickinson

Law Review 31; review of Pennsylvania decisions (1927) Nirdlingers
Estate 290 Pa. 457. General discussion of all rules-notes (1921) 13
A. L. R. 1004; (1923) 24 A. L. R. 9; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 448; (1927) 50
A. L. R. 375; (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1287, 1315; (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1532.
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the "American" or "Pennsylvania" rule is, that in every
extraordinary distribution the time when the profits were
earned by the corporation determines who the recipient of
the extraordinary distribution should be and to what extent, and that apportionment should be made accordingly
between income and corpus.2 This rule, popular because of
its evident equitableness, has been discarded in the second
tentative draft (1929) of a Uniform Principal and Income
Act, and the Massachusetts rule adopted because of its
much greater simplicity of application. Section 5, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS AND SHARE RIGHTS. "All dividends accruing on shares of a corporation which form a
part of the principal and payable in the shares of such
corporation shall be deemed principal-all dividends payable otherwise than in the shares of the corporation itself
shall be deemed income. Where the trustee shall have the
option of receiving a dividend either in cash or in shares
of the declaring corporation, it shall be considered a cash
dividend and deemed income, irrespective of the choice
made by the trustee."' The basis of this rule is the form
4
in which the dividend is declared.
The majority rule has been applied in Pennsylvania to
stock dividends, 5 extraordinary cash dividends,6 rights to
subscribe to stock,7 liquidation by a corporation, or on a
sale by the trustee shortly before liquidation which the
court held tantamount thereto,8 and a sale of the shares
by the trustee at a price largely in excess of their actual
value at the inception of the trust.9 In a recent case10 where
2

Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (1929) 112, 285 et seq. Second tentative draft prepared by Dean
Charles E. Clark.
'Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 108 (1868).
5Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344 (1891).
0Stake's Estate (No. 1), 240 Pa. 277 (1913); Stake's Estate (No.
2), 240 Pa. 288 (1913).
T
Jones v. Integrity Trust Company, 292 Pa. 149 (1928).
5

8

McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78 (1919).
Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457 (1927).
'OGraham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436 (1929).
9
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two banking corporations merged, and where in order to
adjust the respective contributions of the merging corporations to the resulting cororation the stockholders of one
corporation received more shares in the new enterprise
than the stockholders in the other, the court held the rule
applied and ordered distribution, on the finding of the auditing judge that the additional shares were an extraordinary
dividend, to which finding there was no objection. A later
case, on the other hand, holds that on a merger where the
parties received the same number of shares of which the
book value was largely increased, the addition was not
income but merely an increase in the original value of the
shares."L The court in this case points out that a merger is
not a liquidation because all the assets of the corporations
involved continue intact in the new corporation, representing a substantial value reflected in the price of the shares.
It was not a sale because there was no severance of all the
rights in the shareholders. The issuance of new stock was
considered new evidence of ownership.
Beginning with Boyer's Appeal 12 the supreme court consistently held that the creator's intention to have such distributions treated as income or corpus was conclusive.
While this rule was extant it was safe for attorneys to
advise a provision in the trust instrument providing specifically for the retention of all extraordinary distributions as
part of the corpus of the estate and so avoid an apportionment. Lately the court has qualified the rule by saying
that, "What the deed or will specifies must be carried into
effect, so far as it is legal." '-1 At the time of this qualification
it was believed the court had in mind a New York decision
which held that the creator could not call that corpus which
the decisions of the state determined to be income, because
such a direction would violate the statutes prohibiting accumulations of income, and consequently such a provision
liBuist's

Estate, 297 Pa. 537 (1929).
See also 24 A. L. R. 9 (Note); Robinson's

12224 Pa. 144 (1909).

Trust, 218 Pa. 481 (1907).

12Jones v. Integrity Trust Company, 292 Pa. 149 (1928).
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invalidated a codicil to a will." This belief is strikingly
confirmed by a current decision of our Supreme Court.1 '
The testator gave his residuary estate in trust to pay the
net income to his widow for life with remainder over, with
a provision in the residuary clause that "all stock dividends
shall be considered principal". Mr. Chief Justice Moschzisker there declared that despite the testator's direction
that all stock dividends should be considered as principal,
they remain income because so held by the courts as a
rule of law; and since this income is in effect ordered to
be unlawfully accumulated under sec. 9 of the Act of 1853,
P. L. 503, 507, it became presently distributable.
It has been said that the apportionment theory as laid
down by the court is broad enough, where the creator only
uses the word "income", to cover every conceivable kind of
distribution to which the apportionment theory applies, and
that as a result the beneficiary in a spendthrift trust would
get large blocks of stock which he could readily convert
into cash and dissipate. Although this would logically follow from Maris's Estate, (supra), it is unlikely that such an
obviously unintended result would be permitted, but rather
that an exception would be created and the dividend given
to the remainderman, or as in a lower court case' hold that
the dividend was corpus. The apportionment theory is an
equitable rule and should be flexible and adaptable to such
equity seeking cases to bring about just results.
Another query ha been, how will the income be distributed where there are successive life tenants and the first
life tenant dies before the dividend is declared. In a late
case, 17 where there were successive life tenants and the
first had died before the extraordinary dividend was declared, it was held that there is a presumption that the dividend is payable to the party entitled to the income when
the dividend is declared (here the second life tenant), but
that this presumption must yield to proof of adverse facts,
"In Re Megrue, 217 N. Y. 653 (1915).

"Maris's Estate, 301 Pa. 20 (1930).
'6Pitcairn's Estate, 70 Pittsburgh Law Journal 417 (1922).
"Graham's Estate, 296 Pa. 436 (1929).
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that is, proof of the manner in which the dividend is made
up and that its existence will not injure the original investment or intact value. In this case counsel for the first
life-tenant's heirs did not prove such adverse facts and the
whole dividend was awarded to the second life-tenant. From
this decision it would appear that in a proper case the
supreme court will distribute such a dividend among successive life tenants accordingly as the dividend was earned
during the tenancy. The question has never been decided
by the supreme court but has been settled as suggested in
an unreported county case.' 8
Such a decision has been reached in New Jersey, a
state following the Pennsylvania rule."" Vice Chancellor
Buchanan there said, "When the gift of income to a life
tenant or successive life tenants is in general language, and
there is nothing to indicate a different intention, it would
seem the fair interpretation to accord to the testator the
intention that each life tenant should have as income such
profits as were earned by the capital of the trust during the
life tenancy; and this seems the fairest disposition from the
point of equity. This would lead to the apportionment, between the second life tenant and the estate of the first life
tenant, of so much of any dividend declared after the death
of the first life tenant as represented earnings; such apportionment to be in accordance with the share of the earn-.
ings earned in the respective lives of the two life-tenants."
The courts, in determining the value of the stock at
time of testator's death and after the declaration of the
stock dividend, in order to make apportionment accordingly,
have used many different tests to determine that value.
Earp's Appeal (1857)20 was decided on market values, Moss'
Appeal (1877)22 used actual or intrinsic values in order to
avoid fluctuations of the stock market, and in Eisner's
'8 Miller's Estate, Orphans Court of Philadelphia County, January
Term, 1909, No. 65.
19
Hagedorn v. Arens, (N. J. 1930) 150 Adt. 4.
2028 Pa. 368.
2183 Pa. 264.
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Estate, (1896)22 actual value to be determined from the best
methods at command was the test adopted. After Stake's
Estate, (1913)23 book value was almost always used, but this
test was repudiated in Thompson's Estate, (1918)24 where the

court said they were interested only in actual value and not
concerned with book value. In view of this uncertainty
Baird's Estate (1930)1 5 at least offers temporary relief. It
was there held that book value is the test. The court said,
"The prima facie standard of measurement of intact value
of trust estates, the income of which is to be paid to a
beneficiary with remainder over, is the book value; and this
standard remains fixed unless it can be established that the
elements making up the book value are not true values".
It is interesting to note the court's reasons for adopting
this as a test as they show the courts are trying where
possible to simplify the rule. It is pointed out that capitalization of income over long periods and the averaging of
values cannot be considered because too uncertain for
definite purposes; and actual appraisment, though sometimes necessary where book value is not available, is often
impossible because of prohibitive costs.
W. H. Dunbar, III

THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
Running through almost every phase of its law, is an
extraordinary protection given to infants in Pennsylvania.
Sometimes, apparently, this protection was unwarranted.
However, until recently it was never questioned that infant
trespassers were in no better position than adults.
Within the past few years our courts, probably inadvertently, have allowed statements to creep into their
Pa. 143.
Pa. 277 and (No. 2) 240 Pa. 288.
24262 Pa. 278.
22175

23240

21299 Pa. 39.

